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Entropy and Attack Models in Information
Flow?
(Invited talk)
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In recent years, there has been a growing interest in considering the quanti-
tative aspects of Information Flow, partly because often the a priori knowledge
of the secret information can be represented by a probability distribution, and
partly because the mechanisms to protect the information may use randomiza-
tion to obfuscate the relation between the secrets and the observables.
Several works in literature use an Information Theoretic approach to model
the problem and define the leakage in a quantitative way, see for example
[17,4,9,10,13,12,2]. The idea is that the system is seen as a channel. The input
represents the secret, the output represents the observable, and the correlation
between the input and output (mutual information) represents the information
leakage. The worst case leakage corresponds then to the capacity of the channel,
which is by definition the maximum mutual information that can be obtained
by varying the input distribution.
In the works mentioned above, the notion of mutual information is based on
Shannon entropy, which (because of its mathematical properties) is the most es-
tablished measure of uncertainty. From the security point of view, this measure
corresponds to a particular model of attack and a particular way of estimating
the security threat (vulnerability of the secret). Other notions have been consid-
ered, and argued to be more appropriate for security in certain scenarios. These
include: Re´nyi min-entropy [1,16], Bayes risk [3], guessing entropy [11], and
marginal guesswork [14]. Ko¨pf and Basin discuss the relation between brute-
force guessing attacks and entropy in [8], in the context of information flow
induced by a deterministic program, and define the information leakage as dif-
ference between the input entropy and the conditional one, namely the entropy
based on the a priori input distribution, and the entropy of the a posteriori dis-
tribution (i.e. after observing teh output), respectively. One of their main results
is that, in their framework, the notion of leakage under the various notions of
attacks considered in their paper is always non-negative.
In this talk, we extend the analysis of Ko¨pf and Basin to the probabilistic
scenario, and we consider also other notions of entropy, including the family
of entropies proposed by Re´nyi [15]. We argue that in the probabilistic case
the notion of information leakage needs to be revised. In fact, when the same
secret can give different observables (according to a probability distribution),
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the difference between a priori and a posteriori entropy may be negative. This
is due to the fact that the notion of entropy uses the probability distribution in
two different ways: for averaging and for representing the belief of the attacker.
While the leakage should depend on the difference induced by the belief change
due to the observation, the averaging probability should remain the same. (A
similar concern has also inspired the works of [5] and [7].) In order to avoid
the unnatural consequence of a negative leakage, we propose to base the notion
of leakage directly on the (more primitive) notion of mutual information. We
consider some cases of entropy, in particular the Re´nyi’s entropies, for which the
corresponding notion of mutual information has been investigated in [6], and we
show that in this way the property of non-negativeness is ensured.
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